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INTRODUCTION
3
DOSE v. CouncilforBetterEducaion'transformed Kentucky education, but4
its significance extends far beyond the borders of the Commonwealth.
First, Rose, together with the decisions from Montana5 and Texas, 6 launched
the third wave of school finance litigation.7 By 1989, the second wave

i University Counsel & Assistant Professor of Government, Christopher Newport
University. B.A., Hanover College; M.A., the University of Melbourne (Australia); J.D., the
University of Virginia School of Law. The views expressed are those of the Author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Rector & Visitors of Christopher Newport University or
the Attorney General of Virginia.
2 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
3 See Kentucky Education Reform Act of 199o, ch. 476, 199o Ky. Acts 12o8.

4 Rose also effectively launched my career as a scholar. My comprehensive examination
of state constitutional analysis in school finance litigation was published a few months after
Rose. William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions
in PublicSchool FinanceReform Litigation,75 VA. L. REV. 1639 (1989).
5 Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989). For a commentary on the Montana litigation, see Wayne Buchanan & Deborah A. Verstegen, Commentary,
School Finance Litigation in Montana,66 WEsT'S E Duc. L. REP. 19 (1991).

6 Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
7 Since the third wave began, virtually every state high court has dealt with a school
finance suit:
Alabama: Exparte James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002); Opinion of the justices, 624 So. 2d
107 (Ala. 1993).

Alaska: Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1997).
Arizona: Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 8o6 (Ariz. 1994).
Arkansas: Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002).

Colorado: Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358 (Colo. 2009).
Florida: Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 68o So. 2d 400
(Fla. 1996).

Idaho: Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993).
Indiana: Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516 (nd. 2009).
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Illinois: Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (111. 1996).
Kansas: Montoy v. State, 102 P.3d i 6o (Kan.), supplemented, 112 P.3d 923 (Kan.), republishedwith concurringopinion, 120 P3d 306 (Kan. 2005); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885
P.zd 1170 (Kan. 1994).
Kentucky: Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
Maine: Sch. Admin. Dist. No. I v. Comm'r., 659 A.2d 854 (Me. 1995).
Maryland: Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.zd 758 (Md. 1983).
Massachusetts: Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005); McDuffy v.
Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
Minnesota: Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. '993).
Missouri: Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 294 S.W3d 477 (Mo. 2009); Comm. for Educ.
Equal. v. State, 878 S.W.ad 446 (Mo. 1994).
Montana: Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 2005 MT 69, 326 Mont.
304, 109 P 3 d 257; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
Nebraska: Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.d 164 (Neb.
2007); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.zd 349 (Neb. 1993).
New Hampshire: Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 1z v. State, 958 A.2d 930 (N.H.
2008); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993).
New Jersey: Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.zd 989 (N.J. 2oo9); Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.ad 417
(N.J. 1997); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.ad 359 (N.J. 199o); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.ad 273 (N.J.
1973).
New York: Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 8oi N.E.ad 326 (N.Y. 2003); Reform
Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Bd. of Educ. v.
Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982).
North Carolina: Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004); Leandro
v. State, 468 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997).
North Dakota: Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.ad 247, (N.D. 1994).
Ohio: State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.ad 195 (Ohio 2003); DeRolph v. State, 780
N.E.ad 529 (Ohio 2002); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
Oklahoma: Okla. Educ. Ass'n v. State, I58 P.3d 1058 (Okla. 2007); Fair Sch. Fin. Council
of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987).
Oregon: Withers v. State, 891 P.2d 675 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Coal. for Equitable Sch.
Funding, Inc. v. State, 8i I P.2d 116 (Or. I991).
Pennsylvania: Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d I IO (Pa. 1999).
Rhode Island: City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.ad 40 (R.I. 1995).
South Carolina: Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.zd 535 (S.C. 1999).
South Dakota: Olson v. Guindon, 771 N.W.ad 318 (S.D. 2009).
Tennessee: Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91 S.W.3d 232 (Tenn. 2002); Tenn. Small
Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 894 S.W.2d 734 (Tenn. 1995); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 85i
S.W.ad 139 (Tenn. 1993).
Texas: Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3 d 746 (Tex. 2005);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. i9i); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
Vermont: Brigham v. State, 692 A.ad 384 (Vt. 1997).
Virginia: Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994).
Washington: Sch. District's Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Educ. v. State, 202
P.3d 99o (Wash. Ct. App. 2oo9), reh'ggranted,217 P 3 d 337 (Wash. 2009).
West Virginia: Bd. of Educ. of the County of Kanawha v. W. Va. Bd. of Educ., 639 S.E.ad
893 (W. Va. 2006); State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. for the County of Randolph v. Bailey, 453 S.E.2d
368 (W. Va. 1994).
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of school finance litigation8 had become a mere ripple. 9 The States had
prevailed in most second wave cases'0 and it had been six years since any

Wisconsin: Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2ooo).
Wyoming: Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 181 P.3d 43 (Wyo. 2008); State v. Campbell
County Sch. Dist., 32 P3d 325 (Wyo. 2001); State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 19 P.3d
518 (Wyo. aooi); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. I995); Washakie
County Sch. Dist. No. I v. Herschler, 6o6 P.2d 3 10 (Wyo. 1980); Sweetwater County Planning
Comm. for the Org. of Sch. Dists. v. Hinkle, 491 Pzd 1234 (Wyo. 1971).
8 The second wave of school finance litigation, which was a direct response to San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that the National
Constitution does not require equal education expenditures), illustrates the revival of constitutional law that began in the 1970S. See A. E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional
Rights in the Day of the BurgerCourt, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976). Because of this revival, "it would
be most unwise these days not also to raise the state constitutional questions." William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489, 502
(I977)9 During the Second Wave from 1973 to early I989, the following states experienced
school finance litigation:
Arizona: Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973).
Arkansas: DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 3o , 6SI S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983).
California: Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.ad 929 (Cal. 1976).
Colorado: Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
Connecticut: Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
Georgia: McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d I56 (Ga. 1981).
Idaho: Thompson v. Engelking, 537 Pad 635 (Idaho 1975).
Illinois: Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46 (I11.1973).
Louisiana: La. Ass'n of Educators v. Edwards, 52I So. 2d 390 (La. 1988).
Maryland: Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983).
Michigan: Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973).
Montana: State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.2d 776 (Mont. 1974).
New Jersey: Robinson ex re/. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
New York: Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359
(N.Y. 1982).
North Carolina: Britt v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.ad 432 (N.C. Ct. App.), aff'd, 361
S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987).
Ohio: Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of Cincinnati v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio
1979).
Oregon: Olsen v. State, 554 P.ad 139 (Or. 1976).
Pennsylvania: Danson v. Casey, 3 9 9 A.zd 36o (Pa. 1979).
South Carolina: Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988).
Washington: Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 Pd 71 (Wash. 1978); Northshore Sch.
Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.ad 178 (Wash. 1974).
West Virginia: Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
Wisconsin: Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.ad 568 (Wis. I989).
Wyoming: Washakie County School Dist. No. I v. Herschler, 6o6 P.2d 310 (Wyo. i98o).
io During the second wave, the highest courts of Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and
Wisconsin upheld their state school finance systems. In contrast, the highest courts of
Arkansas, California, New Jersey, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming invalidated their
school finance systems. See CHARLES J. Russo, REUTTER'S THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
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plaintiffs' victory. 1 Without the 1989 trilogy, there would be no third wave.
12

Second, Rose and the other 1989 decisions validated the adequacy
theory of school finance litigation. 3 For the first time, courts invalidated
educational finance systems not because the expenditures were unequal
(the equity theory), 14 but because some schools lacked the money to meet
minimum standards of quality (the adequacy theory)." The adequacy
theory avoided the significant constitutional ramifications 6 of the equity

347-48 (7th ed. 2009) (listing cases).
II The last plaintiff's victory of the second wave was in Arkansas in 1983. DuPree,651
S.W.zd 90.
12 I originated this categorization of school finance cases into three waves with each
wave involving a different constitutional theory. See William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The
Impactof the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Futureof PublicSchool FinanceReform
Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219 (1990) (explaining that the first wave emphasized the federal
equal protection clause, the second wave emphasized the state constitutions and the equity
theory, and the third wave emphasized the state constitutions and the adequacy theory).
Other scholars generally accept the analogy. William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard
Questions Posedby Rodriguez: Ending the Separation of School Financeand EducationalPolicy by
Bridgingthe Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN. L. REV. 721 (1992); William H. Clune,
The Shift From Equity to Adequacy in School Finance,8 EDUC. Pou'r 376 (I994); John Dayton et
al., Education FinanceLitigation:A Review of Recent State High Court Decisionsand Their Likely
Impact on Future Litigation, I86 WEST'S Eouc. L. REP. I (2004); John Dayton & Anne Dupre,
School FundingLitigation: Who's Winning the War?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2359-76 (2004); Peter
Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directionsin School FinanceReform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101
(1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutions,School FinanceLitigation,andthe "Third Wave": From
Equity to Adequacy, 68T MP. L. REV. 1151(1995); Michael Heise, EqualEducationalOpportunity,
Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An EmpiricalPerspective and
Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 571-79 (1998); Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging
Right to Education UnderState ConstitutionalLaw,65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325 (1992); Gail E Levine,
Meetingthe Third Wave: LegislativeApproaches to Recent JudicialSchool FinanceRulings, 28 HARv.
J. ON LEGIS. 507 (1991); Mildred Wigfall Robinson, FinancingAdequate EducationalOpportunity,
14 J.L. & POL. 483, 495-501 (1998); David C. Thompson, Commentary, School Finance andthe
Courts: A Reanalysis of Progress, 59 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 945 (I990); Julie K. Underwood &
William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation:A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
Pou'r 517 (i99); Julie K. Underwood, School FinanceAdequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 493 (1995).
13 See Underwood & Sparkman, supranote 12, at 536; Buchanan & Verstegen, supra note
5, at 32; Thompson, supra note 12, at 960-66; Thro, supra note 12, at 239.
14 To be sure, a number of scholars assert that there is no real distinction between
the adequacy theory and the equity theory. See William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standardsand
InstitutionalConstraints:A Re-examination of the JurisprudentialHistory of EducationalFinance
Reform Litigation,43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. I185, 1283-96 (2003); James E. Ryan, Standards,
Testing, andSchool FinanceLitigation, 86 TEx. L. REV. 1223, 1238 (2008).
15 See Underwood & Sparkman, supra note 12, at 536-37, 543; Buchanan & Verstegen,
supra note 5, at 32; Thro, supranote 12, at 238-39.
16 For a discussion of constitutional implications of the equity theory, see Molly McUsic,
The Use of EducationClauses in School FinanceReform Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGS. 307, 31214(991).
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theory17 and allowed moderate and conservative justices to rule for the
plaintiffs."'
Third, by invalidating the entire educational system, 9 Rose recognized
that educational equality depends not on money or racial desegregation, but
involves the complex interaction of multiple factors.2 0 Twenty years later,
in Hornev. Flores,2 ' the U.S. Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion. 2
Both the courts in other states and the academy generally ignore this aspect
of Rose, z but it represents a profound truth.
While launching the third wave, validating the adequacy theory, and
recognizing that educational equality involves more than financial factors
are certainly significant, the most significant aspect of Rose is the court's
embrace of judicial humility. To be sure, this sounds counterintuitive.
A case that invalidates an entire educational system is not narrow, but
breathtakingly broad. A decision that fundamentally changes an entire
area of law does not seem humble, but arrogant. An opinion that prompts
the legislature to undertake a comprehensive reform of education and to
enact a massive tax hike appears not restrained, but activist. Yet, contrary
to conventional wisdom, judicial humility does not mean upholding laws,
refusing to embrace new legal theories, or maintaining the status quo.
In addressing constitutional questions, courts must resolve the tension
between judicial duty and judicial deference. 4 On the one hand, "judicial
17 In order to prevail under this equity theory, the plaintiffs have to persuade the court
that education is a fundamental right under the state constitution, see Serrano v. Priest, 557
P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.zd 359 (Conn. 1977); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.zd
859 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. I v. Herschler, 606 Pad 310 (Wyo. 198o),
or that wealth is a suspect class under the state constitution, or that the finance system is iro,
rational. See DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No.3 651 S.W.zd 90 (Ark. 1983).
18 During the third wave, the highest courts of Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming upheld their state
school finance systems. See Russo, supra note I0,at 347-48 (listing cases). In contrast, the
highest courts of Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Montana,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Wyoming
invalidated their state school finance systems. See id. Some states have experienced multiple
suits during the third wave and this leads to state courts both upholding and invalidating their
school finance system.
19 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989).
20 Some scholars call for a renewed emphasis on financial resources. See William S. Koski
& Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreatfrom Equity in EducationalLaw andPolicy and
Why ItMatters,56 EMORY L.J. 545, 547 (zoo6).
21 Home v. Flores, 129 S.Ct. 2579 (2oo9). For some early observations about the impact
of Horne, see William E. Thro, The Many Faces of Compliance: The Supreme Court's Decision in
Home v. Flores, ScH. Bus. AFF., Oct. 2oo9,at 14.
22 Home, 129 S. Ct. at 26oo-o6.
23 But see D. Frank Vinik, The Contrasting Politics of Remedy: The Alabama and Kentucky
SchoolEquity FundingSuits, 22 J. Eouc. FIN. 6o (1996).
24 A.E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State ConstitutionalLaw, I EMERGING ISSUES IN
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power includes the duty 'to say what the law is."' s On the other hand,
judges must not "frustrate the expressed will of Congress or that of the state
legislatures."' 6 Some courts become activist and frustrate the will of the
state legislatures, while other courts abdicate their duty to say what the law
is. Judicial humility remains faithful to constitutional text, recognizes the
limits of judicial competence, and respects other constitutional values.2 7 Put
another way, judicial humility combines Justice Scalia's originalism, s Chief
Justice Roberts' minimalism,"9 and Justice Kennedy's structuralism.3"
Except for its embrace of an aspirational rather than substantive quality
standard-a deviation that has no practical significance-Rose is a judicially
humble opinion. The decision remains faithful to the constitutional text,
implicitly acknowledges the limits of judicial competence, and respects
other constitutional values. Indeed, for those who believe that judges are
umpires rather than players in the political process, Rose illustrates the
proper balance between judicial activism and judicial abdication.31
The purpose of this Article is to examine the characteristics of judicial
humility-fidelity to the constitutional text, recognition of the limits
STATE CONST. L. 1,13 (1988).
25 Sanchez-Llamas v.Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353 (2o06).
z6 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1953).
27 Ultimately, every governmental decision involves two questions: (1)Is the contemplated action constitutional and legal?; and (2) if the action is constitutional and legal, is it
sound public policy? There are proposed policies that are constitutional and legal, but unwise. Conversely, there are proposed policies that are wise, but unconstitutional or illegal. A
humble court does not hesitate to decide whether an action is constitutional or legal, but it
expresses no view on the wisdom of an action.
28 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law
Courts].
29 For a discussion of the Chief Justice's influence on the Court, see William E. Thro,
Commentary, An Essay: The Roberts CourtAt Dawn:Clarity, Humility, andtheFutureof Education
Law, 222 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 491 (2007).
30 See FRANK J.COLUCCi, JUSTICE KENNEDY'S JURISPRUDENCE: THIE FULL AND NECESSARY
MEANING OF LIBERTY

135-69 (2009).

31 My theory of judicial humility is a refinement of ideas that I have expressed in previous work. Fidelity to constitutional text and the importance of differences among the education clauses is a theme that underlies all of my writing on school finance, but was central
in William E. Thro, Commentary, The Role of Languageof the State Education Clauses in School
FinanceLitigation, 79 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 19 (1993). Recognition of the limits of judicial
competence was a theme in William E. Thro, JudicialAnalysis Duringthe Third Wave of School
Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597 (I994) and was
explored more fully in William E. Thro,A New Approachto State ConstitutionalAnalysisin School
FinanceLitigation, 14 J.L. & POL. 525, 534 (1998) [hereinafter Thro, New Approach]. The notion that other constitutional values play a significant role in school finance litigation was
discussed in William E. Thro, Commentary, An Essay: The School Finance Paradox:How the
ConstitutionalValues of Decentralizationand JudicialRestraint Inhibit the Achievement of Quality
Education, I97 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 477 (2005).
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of judicial competence, and respect for other constitutional valuesand explain why Rose is a judicially humble decision. Each part of this
Article examines a characteristic of judicial humility and explains how
Rose embodies that characteristic. Although Rose invalidated all aspects
of Kentucky's educational system and prompted a comprehensive reform,
it remained faithful to the constitutional text, acknowledged the limits of
judicial competence, and respected other constitutional values.
I.

FIDELITY TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT

A. Overview
The first characteristic of judicial humility is fidelity to the constitutional
text. In the third wave of school finance litigation, textual fidelity centers
on the education clauses. 3 Textual fidelity, which involves many of the
elements of originalism as espoused by Justice Scalia, 33 has three aspects.
First, when facing a constitutional question, courts "must never forget
that it is a constitution we are expounding." 34 Constitutions are "intended
to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs. ' 3 They "are not ephemeral enactments, designed
to meet passing occasions ....The future is their care, and provision for
36
events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made."
Mistakes in statutory interpretation require only a legislative amendment,
but mistakes in constitutional interpretation endure until overruled by the
court or the amendment process.
State constitutions are fundamentally different from the National
Constitution-the National Constitution is a grant of power and the
state constitutions are limitations on power. 37 Thus, the presumptions
concerning legislative authority are reversed. Congress may not act unless
it can identify a specific enumerated power,3s but the state legislature
may act unless there is an explicit restriction. 39 Moreover, because state

32 During the first and second waves, the textual focus was on state equal protection
clauses. See, e.g., Thro, supranote 12, at 222-32, 241.

33 For a comprehensive analysis of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence, see RALPH A. RossuM,
See also William E. Thro,
LimitingJudges:A Review of Ralph A. Rossum's Antonin Scalia's Jurisprudence, 33 J.C. & U.L.
169 (zoo6).
34 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).
ANTONIN SCALIA'S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND TRADITION (2006).

35 Id. at415.
36 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,373 (1910).

37 Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 785 (Md. 1983); Bd. of
Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359,366 n.5 (N.Y. 1982).
38 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,607 (zooo).

39 Almond v. R.I. Lottery Comm'n, 756 A.2d 186, 196 (R.I. 2ooo).
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constitutions are frequently amended or even completely revised, 4° they
often are more reflective of the contemporary values of society.4' Yet, these
fundamental differences do not diminish the unique nature of constitutional
interpretation.
Second, the meaning of text-whether constitutional or statutory-turns
on the plain meaning of the words. The purpose of some constitutional
provisions concerning education may have been aspirational, 42 but "it is
simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with
fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the
lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated. '43 Recent
school finance decisions generally have emphasized the importance of
constitutional text, but have not embraced the theory of textual differences
articulated above. 44 Rather, these courts have used the text to justify the
45
avoidance of constitutional claims.
Third, just as the "practices of other nations, particularly other
democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform
among our people ...

occupies a place ...

in our Constitution," 46 the

40 See Robert F Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State
Constitutions andthe Washington Declaration ofRights, in DEVELOPMENTS INSTATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 239, 241-42 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1984).

41 As Professor Howard explained:
A state constitution is a fit place for the people of a state to record
their moral values, their definition of justice, their hopes for the common
good. A state constitution defines a way of life. George Mason understood that precept when, in drafting Virginia's Declaration of Rights in
1776, he wrote that "no free government, nor the blessings of liberty,
can be preserved to any people" but by a "frequent recurrence to fundamental principles."
Howard, supra note 24, at 14.

42 Although courts frequently rely on a historical analysis of the intent of the Framers, see
John Dayton, Commentary, An Anatomy of School Funding Litigation, 77 WEST'S EDOuc. L. REP.
627, 643 (199), this reliance is problematic. First, since state constitutions are frequently
revised, and since the Framers of the new document often simply adopt the words of the old
document without change, it is not clear which set of Framers' intentions should guide the
court. Second, because newly admitted states "borrowed heavily from earlier state constitutions [of previously admitted states]," A.E. Dick Howard, Introduction:A Frequent Recurrence To
FundamentalPrinciples, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xiii (Bradley

D. McGraw ed., 1984) [hereinafter Howard, Introduction], the intention of the Framers may be
nothing more than a decision to borrow. Third, as constitutions were revised and rewritten,
the education clause language often stayed the same. See, e.g., GA.CONsT. art. VIII, § I, para. I
(containing the same language as the education provision in the 1945 Georgia Constitution).
43 Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 28, at 17.
44 William E. Thro & R. Craig Wood, The Constitutional Text Matters: Reflections on Recent
School Finance Cases, WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. (forthcoming 2oIo).
45 Id.
46 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia,J.,
dissenting). Of course,
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language of one state's constitutional provisions can be relevant to
47
determining the significance of a second state's constitutional provisions.
Since state constitutions reflect the unique values and aspirations of a
state's citizens, differences between the states logically reflect differences
in values.48
Comparing constitutional provisions among States is particularly
relevant in school finance litigation. Every state constitution has a
provision mandating, at a minimum, that the State provide a system of free
public schools,49 but the level of the duty imposed by the constitutional
text varies a great deal. 0 At one end of the spectrum are the twenty-one
"where there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations,
however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed
upon Americans through the Constitution." Id.
47 By emphasizing the textual differences among states, this Article advocates for
a form of "horizontal federalism." See Ronald K. L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions:
Some Random Thoughts, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14-15 (Bradley D.
McGraw ed., 1985).
48 As Professor Howard observed:
Those who contend for independent norms of [state constitutional]
analysis should not lightly disregard the case for nationwide norms, especially as regards individual rights. The lay citizen, not tutored in the
nuances of constitutional law, is apt to think of rights as rights. He might
find it unsettling to think that one's "rights" [or the status of education]
... may vary from state to state. This notion of a "common market" of
constitutional rights has strong moral overtones. -Any principled theory
of state constitutional litigation that invites standards that may vary (as
they do) from state to state certainly should take account of this issue.
Howard, Introduction,supra note 42, at xviii (footnotes omitted).
49 See ALA. CONsT. art. XIV; § 256; ALASKA CONsT. art. VII, § I; ARIZ. CONsT. art. XI; § I;
ARK. CONsT. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONsT. art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONsT. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONsT. art.
VIII, § I; DEL. CONsT. art. X, § I; FLA. CONsT. art. IX, § I; GA. CONsT. art. VIII, § I, para. I; HAw.
CONsT. art. X, § I; IDAHO CONsT. art. IX, § I; ILL. CONsT. art. X, § 1; IND. CONsT. art. VIII, § I;
IOWA CONST. art. IX, pt. 2, § 3; KAN. CONsT. art. VI, § i; Ky. CONST. § 183; LA. CONsT. art. VIII, §
I; ME. CONsT. art. VIII, pt. I, § I; MD. CONsT. art. VIII, § I; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; MICH.
CONsT. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § i; MIss. CONsT. art. VIII, § 2oi; Mo. CONsT. art.
IX, § I(a); MONT. CONsT. art. X, § I; NEB. CONsT. art. VII, § I; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H.
CONST. Pt. 2, art. 83; N.J. CONsT. art. VIII, § 4; N.M. CONsT. art. XII, § I; N.Y. CONsT. art. XI, § I;
N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONsT. art. VIII, § I; OHIO CONsT. art. VI, § 3; OKLA. CONsT. art.
XIII, § I; OR. CONsT. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONsT. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONsT. art. XII, § i; S.C. CONST.
art. XI, § 3; S.D. CoNsr. art. VIII, § I; TENN. CONsT. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONsT. art. VII, § I; UTAH
CONsT. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 68; VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § I; WASH. CONsT. art. IX, § I; W.
VA. CONsT. art. XII, § I; WIs. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYO. CONsT. art. VII, § I.
50 The education clauses are divided into four categories based upon the level of duty
imposed by the text. See Erica Black Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right To
Bilingual Education, 9 HAiv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52, 66-70 (1974); Gershon M. Ratner, A New
Legal Duty For Urban PublicSchools: Effective Education In Basic Skills, 63 TEx. L. REV. 777, 814
nn. 143-46 (1985). My scholarship refines the basic framework developed by Professors Grubb
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"establishment provisions," which simply mandate that a free public school
system be established and nothing more."' In the middle are eighteen
"quality provisions," which mandate that an educational system of a specific
quality be provided. 2 Similarly, there are six "strong mandate" provisions
that establish a level of quality and provide a strong mandate to achieve
it.s3 Finally, at the far end of the spectrum are five "high duty provisions,"
which seem to place education above other governmental functions such
as highways or welfare. 54
and Ratner.
51 See ALA. CONsT. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONsT. art. VII, § I; ARIZ. CONsT. art. XI, § I;
CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § I; HAw. CONST. art. X, § I; KAN. CONsT. art. VI, § I; LA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ I; MAsS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; MIcH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; Mo.
CONST. art. IX, § I; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § I; N.H. CONST. Pt. 2, art. 83; N.M. CONsT. art. XII, §
I; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § I; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § I; S.C. CONsT. art.
XI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § I2; UTAH CONsT. art. X, § I; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 68.
A typical example of an establishment provision clause is Tennessee's, which provides:
"The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance, support and eligibility standards
of a system of free public schools." TENN. CONsT. art. XI, § 12.
52 See ARK. CONsT. art. XIV, § I; COLO. CONsT. art. IX, § 2; DEL. CONsT. art. X, § I; IDAHO
CONsT. art. IX, § I; Ky. CONST. § 183; MD. CONsT. art. VIII, § I; MINN. CONsT. art. XIII, § I;
MONT. CONsT. art. X, § I; N.J. CONsT. art. VIII, § 4; N.D. CONsT. art. VIII, § I; OHIO CONsT. art.
VI, § 3; OR. CONsT. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONsT. art. III, § 14; Tx. CONsT. art. VII, § I; VA. CONsT. art.
VIII, § I; W. VA. CONsT. art. XII, § I; WIs. CONsT. art. X, § 3; WYo. CONsT. art. VII, § I.
A typical example is the Pennsylvania education clause, which provides: "The General
Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of
public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth." PA. CONsT. art. III, § 14.
Generally, the specific quality is "thorough" and/or "efficient." As the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals observed, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania require "thorough and efficient" systems; Colorado, Idaho, and Montana require
"thorough" systems; and Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, and Texas require "efficient"
systems. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.zd 859,865 (W. Va. 1979).
53 See CAL. CONsT. art. IX, § 5; IND. CONsT. art. VIII, § I; IOWA CONsT. art. IX, pt. 2, § 2; NEv.
CONsT. art. XI, § 2; R.I. CONsT. art. XII, § I; S.D. CONsT. art. VIII, § I.
A typical example is provided by the provisions of the California Constitution, which
reads: "A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation
of the rights and liberties of the people [purposive preamble], the Legislature shall encourage
by all suitable means [stronger mandate] the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and
agricultural improvement." CAL. CONsT. art. IX, § I. Similarly, the Rhode Island education
clause demands that the state legislature "promote public schools ... and to adopt all means.
to secure ... education." R.I. CONsT. art. XII, § I.
54 See FLA. CONsT. art. IX, § I; GA. CONsT. art. VIII, § I, para. 1; ILL. CONsT. art. X, § I; ME.
CONsT. art. VIII, pt. I, § I; WASH. CONsT. art. IX, § I.
These provisions are most clearly exemplified by the Washington state constitution's
education clause, which provides that "[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample
provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or
preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex." WASH. CONsT. art. IX, § I. Although other
states have Category IV education clauses, Washington is apparently the only one that makes
the duty "paramount." Seattle Sch. Dist.No. ! v. State, 585 P.zd 71 , 84 (Wash. 1978).
A second example is Georgia's education clause that reads, "[tihe provision of an adequate public education for the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia..
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These differences among constitutional provisions should be
determinative of whether there is a quality standard.5" For example, if the
text of the constitution is nothing more than an establishment provision,
then there is no quality standard or fundamental right. 56 In contrast, in
those states that have quality provisions, mere establishment is not
sufficient. The system must meet a quality standard.57 Similarly, in those
states that have a "strong mandate" provision as well as a quality standard,
education has been elevated to such importance that it is logical to say it
is a fundamental right.5 8 Of course, in those states that have high duty
provisions, the education system must be of a specific quality, and ensuring
a quality education must come before other state priorities.5 9
B. Rose' Fidelityto the ConstitutionalText
Rose remains faithful to the constitutional text. Kentucky's education
clause provides, "[t]he General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation,6
provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State."
In describing how these "few simple, but direct words" establish "the will
of the people with regard to the importance of providing public education
in the Commonwealth, ' 61 the Court explained:
Several conclusions readily appear from a reading of this section. First,
it is the obligation, the sole obligation, of the General Assembly to provide
for a system of common schools in Kentucky. The obligation to so provide
is clear and unequivocal and is, in effect, a constitutional mandate. Next,
the school system must be provided throughout the entire state, with
no area (or its children) being omitted. The creation, implementation
and maintenance of the school system must be achieved by appropriate
legislation. Finally, the system must be an efficient one. 62
In resolving the critical issue- the meaning of "efficient" -Roseconsidered
"foreign cases, along with our constitutional debates, Kentucky precedents
and the opinion of experts in63formulating the definition of 'efficient' as it
appears in our Constitution.
[the expense of which] shall be provided for by taxation." GA. CONST. art. VIII, § i,para.
Thro, New Approach, supra note 31, at 543-44.
See supra note 51.
See supra note 52.
See supra note 53.
See supra note 54.
6o Ky. CONST. § 183.
61 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.Wzd I86, 205 (Ky. 1989).
62 Id.
63 Id. at21O.
55
56
57
58
59

1.
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Ultimately, Rose reached the right conclusion for the right reasons.
First, the use of the adjective "efficient" suggests a quality standard. To
say that the constitution did not impose a standard is to ignore its plain
meaning. To be sure, instead of "reading text and discerning our society's
traditional understanding of that text," 64 the court sought to ascertain
intent by reviewing constitutional debates. 6" Yet, an examination of the
debates can illuminate the traditional understanding of the text. Second,
because Kentucky's education clause refers to an "efficient system," 66 it
is a "quality provision." 67 Thus, if textual differences are determinative,
there must be a quality standard in Kentucky.6

II.

RECOGNITION OF THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL COMPETENCE

A. Overview
In addition to fidelity to the constitutional text, a second characteristic
of judicial humility is recognition of the limits of judicial competence. In
many respects, this is similar to the judicial minimal approach espoused by
Chief Justice Roberts. Recognition of the limits of judicial competence has
three aspects.
First, courts should be reluctant to entertain facial constitutional
challenges. 69 It is one thing for a court to declare that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to a particular narrow circumstance.7" However,

64 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, IOOO (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65 Rose, 790 S.Wzd at 205-06.
66 Ky. CoNsT. § 183.
67 See supranote 52.
68 Thro, New Approach, supra note 31, at 543-44.
69 As Justice Scalia explained, it is
fundamentally incompatible with [the constitutional] system for the
Court not to be content to find that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to the person before it, but to go further and pronounce that the
statute is unconstitutional in all applications. Its reasoning may well
suggest as much, but to pronounce a holding on that point seems to me
no more than an advisory opinion-which a federal court should never
issue at all, and especially should not issue with regard to a constitutional
question, as to which we seek to avoid even non advisory opinions. I
think it quite improper, in short, to ask the constitutional claimant before us: Do you just want us to say that this statute cannot constitutionally be applied to you in this case, or do you want to go for broke and try
to get the statute pronounced void in all its applications?
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 77 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
70 See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55 (I979).
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it is quite another to say a statute is facially unconstitutional-"invalid in
toto"-and, thus, "incapable of any valid application."71 Passing on the
constitutionality of legislation is "the gravest and most delicate duty that
[the judiciary] is called upon to perform.""2 Therefore, "when considering
a facial challenge it is necessary to proceed with caution and restraint, as
invalidation may result in unnecessary interference with a state regulatory
program."7 3 Indeed, facial challenges "are fundamentally at odds with the
function of the ... courts in our constitutional plan. The power and duty of
the judiciary to declare laws unconstitutional is in the final analysis derived
for resolving concrete disputes brought before the
from its responsibility
74
decision.
for
courts
Second, a court must know what it does not know. "[C]ourts are not
well suited [to] scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state and federal
regulations," and judges should not "substitute their predictive judgments
for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies." 75 Judges generally
do not have advanced degrees in educational policy, and most have no
more than a layperson's knowledge of educational issues. They lack the
expertise to define precisely any standard of educational quality. Indeed,
there is "a renewed concern among judges about their capacity to make
effective decisions on questions of school funding."7 6 Since "the question
of educational quality is inherently one of policy involving philosophical
and practical considerations that call for exercise of legislative and
administrative discretion," 77 "courts pay particular deference to the states
in decisions involving 'the most persistent and difficult questions of
educational policy."' 78 Judicial humility requires a court not to develop its
own substantive standard of educational quality, but to defer to a standard
developed by the legislative and executive branches. 79

71 Viii. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5
(1982).

Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57,64 (1981).
73 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975). Traditionally, the Supreme
Court has been hesitant to invalidate a statute on its face until "state courts [have] the opportunity to construe [the statute] to avoid constitutional infirmities." New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 768 (1982).
74 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (197).
75 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (zoo5).
76 John Dinan, School Finance Litigation: The Third Wave Receder, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE
TO COURTHOUSE: TIE JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 96, 110 (Joshua M. Dunn &
Martin R. West eds., 2009).
77 Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996).
78 Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F3d 481,487 (1oth Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
79 Thro, New Approach,supra note 31, at 546-47. However, the court has a responsibility
to ensure that the standard is rigorous.
72
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Third, instead of regarding courts as "abevy of Platonic Guardians," s
judicial humility recognizes the "myth of the legal profession's
omnicompetence ... was exploded long ago."8 Courts cannot solve our
most pressing problems, much less transform society. "There was a time
when [the judiciary] presumed to make such binding judgments for society,
under the guise of interpreting the Due Process Clause. We should not seek
to reclaim that ground for judicial supremacy.""s Even "uncommonly silly"
laws will be upheld. 3 The revolutionary changes, such as abandoning the
local property tax as a means of financing education, must come through
the political process, not through judicial pontification.
By recognizing the need to avoid facial rulings, the limits of judicial
knowledge, and the inability of courts to transform society, judicial humility
minimizes conflict with the other branches. As the experiences of New
Jersey84 and Ohio s demonstrate, a judicial finding
of unconstitutionality
86
does not necessarily lead to legislative compliance.
B. Rose's Struggle with the Limits of JudicialCompetence
With respect to recognizing the limits of judicial competence, Rose both
rejects and embraces judicial humility.
On the one hand, the justices rejected judicial humility by failing to
recognize their own lack of knowledge of educational policy. Instead of
adopting a quality standard adopted by another branch of government,
Rose developed its own standard. Not surprisingly, it failed. The court
declared:
an efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each and
every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and
written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and
rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social,
8o Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 526 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
81 People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., i i i F3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 1997).
82 United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,347
(2007)

(citation omitted).

83 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
84 Robinson v. Cahill, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.zd 129 (N.J.
1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d
6 (N.J. 1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 339 A.2d 193, reprintedin correctedform, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973);
see alsoAbbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989 (N.J. 2009); Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.zd 417 (N.J. 1997).
85 State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003); DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d
529 (Ohio 2002); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
86 Indeed, when the state legislature and state executive in Ohio failed to implement
the reforms ordered by the Supreme Court of Ohio, the judiciary essentially abdicated any
further role. See Lewis, 789 N.E.2d at 203.
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and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii)
sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to
understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv)
sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical
wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training
or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields
so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and
(vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states,
87
in academics or in the job market.
As noted in 1998, "[i]f this standard is taken literally, there is not a public
school system in America that meets it.""8 A standard that is extraordinarily
difficult to meet and is substantively vague is inappropriate. While that
criticism is still valid, the Kentucky courts' refusal to enforce the standard
tempers the criticism. After twenty years, the Rose standard is not
substantive, but merely aspirational.
On the other hand, Rose embraced judicial humility by recognizing
that judges do not understand the complexities of educational policy. The
court understood the profound truth that many factors, not just financial
disparities, were responsible for the constitutional inadequacies of the
schools. Rose invalidated the entire educational system, 89 but emphasized

87 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.zd 186, 2i2 (Ky. 1989).
88 Thro, New Approach, supra note 3 ,at 548.
89 The court declared:
Lest there be any doubt, the result of our decision is that Kentucky's
entire
system of common schools is unconstitutional. There is no allegation that only part of the common school system is invalid, and we find
no such circumstance. This decision applies to the entire sweep of the
systern-all its parts and parcels. This decision applies to the statutes
creating, implementing and financing the system and to all regulations,
etc., pertaining thereto. This decision covers the creation of local school
districts, school boards, and the Kentucky Department of Education to
the Minimum Foundation Program and Power Equalization Program. It
covers school construction and maintenance, teacher certification---the
whole gamut of the common school system in Kentucky.
While individual statutes are not herein addressed specifically or
considered and declared to be facially unconstitutional, the statutory system as a whole and the interrelationship of the parts therein are hereby
declared to be in violation of Section 183 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Just as the bricks and mortar used in the construction of a schoolhouse,
while contributing to the building's facade, do not ensure the overall
structural adequacy of the schoolhouse, particular statutes drafted by
the legislature in crafting and designing the current school system are
not unconstitutional in and of themselves. Like the crumbling school-

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 98

"the sole responsibility . . . lies with the General Assembly."" Instead of
creating a judicial solution, 9' the court "directed the General Assembly
to re-create [sic] and redesign a new system that .. .will guarantee to
all children the opportunity for an adequate education, through a state
system.""2
III. RESPECT FOR OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
A. Overview
In addition to fidelity to the constitutional text and recognition of the
limits of judicial competence, judicial humility requires a respect for other
constitutional values. In the context of school finance litigation, three other
constitutional values are present.
First, "[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted
than local control over the operation of schools."" Americans distrust any
concentration of power. 4 Our constitutional system "protects us from our
own best intentions" by preventing the concentration of "power in one
location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day."9 Just as the
National Constitution divides power between the states and national
government,% the state charters divide power between the centralized
house which must be redesigned and revitalized for more efficient use,
with some component parts found to be adequate, some found to be
less than adequate, statutes relating to education may be reenacted as
components of a constitutional system if they combine with other component statutes to form an efficient and thereby constitutional system.
Rose, 790 S.W.zd at 215.
90 Id. at zi6.
91 For example, the court could have ordered specific reforms such as a finance system
that did not utilize local property taxes, a system of public school vouchers, a transformation of
the teacher certification process, the consolidation or division of school districts, or the centralized administration of education.
92 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.

93 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
94 William E. Thro, A Pelagian Vision for OurAugustinian Constitution:A Review of Justice
Breyer's Active Liberty, 32 J.C. & U.L. 491, 492, 495-98 (2oo6). As Professor Hamilton has explained, this distrust of concentrations of power is firmly rooted in Calvinist theology, and the
Calvinist perspective was influential in the Framing Era. Marci A. Hamilton, The Calvinist
Paradox of Distrust andHope at the ConstitutionalConvention, in CHmwrAN PERSPECTIVES ON
LEGAL ThOUGHT 293, 295 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., zooz).
95 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992).
96 As Justice Kennedy observed:
The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their
idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and
one federal, each protected from incursion by the other. The resulting
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state governments and local governments. 9 To be sure, this division of
responsibility reflects more the state constitutional structure and historical
understandings than the actual text.9 Nevertheless, "local control remains
an important norm in American education," 99 and "courts view local control
as a fundamental constitutional value, comparable to equal protection or
the right to a basic education found in many state constitutions."' 10°
The constitutional value of local control constrains both the judiciary's
ability to declare the school finance system unconstitutional and, if there is
a violation, to order a sweeping remedy.'' In determining whether there is
a violation, a court must reconcile the constitutional provision regarding free
public education with the constitutional value of local control. 02 The need
to reconcile makes it less likely that there will be a constitutional violation.
Moreover, even if the state court finds a violation, the constitutional value
of decentralization will make it difficult to implement a sweeping remedy
such as centralized financing. 103
Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and design,
establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the
people who sustain it and are governed by it.
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
T-iE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 138 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001) ("Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will, at all
times, stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments; and these will have the
same disposition towards the general government.").
97 The idea of dividing power between a centralized authority and local governments is
firmly rooted in the American tradition. As early as 1768, John Dickinson, in The Lettensfrom a
PennsylvaniaFarmer,suggested that sovereignty was divided between the British Parliament
and the Colonial Legislatures. See I ALFRED H. KELLY, WINFRED A. HARBISON & HERMAN BELZ,
'ME AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 46-47 (7th ed. 1991).
98 Of course, there are some explicit state constitutional provisions mandating a form of
local control. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15; VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 7.
99 Aaron Saiger, Note, DisestablishingLocal School Districts as a Remedy for Educational
Inadequacy,99 COLUM. L. REV. 1830, 1865 (1999) (footnote omitted).
I oo Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Controlin School FinanceReform, 24 CONN. L. REV.
773, 785 (1992).
10i Professor Dyson contends that "[mlost of the courts that have refused to invalidate
the local property tax-based system of school finance have relied on local control as the principal justification for sustaining the status quo." Maurice R. Dyson, PlayingGames with Equality:
A Game Theoretic Critiqueof EducationalSanctions, Remedies, andStrategicNoncompliance, 77 TEMP.
L. REV. 577,599 (zO4). While Professor Dyson exaggerates and, in fact, lists only a handful of
cases, he is correct that local control is a significant factor in school finance litigation.
102 See Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. I v. Booth, 984 P.ad 639, 646 (Colo. 1999) (discussing the need to reconcile the state constitutional provision concerning power of the local
school board with the state constitutional provision concerning power of the State).
io3 Moreover, for the state legislature and state executive, the constitutional value of
decentralization imposes both political and structural restraints on their policy options. Quite
simply, a proposal to have the state government exerting centralized control over all schools
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Second, once authority is allocated between the state government and
local entities, "then the portion [of authority] allotted to each [is] subdivided
among distinct and separate departments.""l Consequently, "a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will
control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself."' 0
The Legislature may not interfere with the Executive's prerogatives, °6 and
vice versa.'07 Of course, the judiciary may not interfere with either the
executive's or the legislature's sphere of responsibilities.
For many courts, separation of powers means determining whether
school finance issues are justiciable." 8 As Professor Bauries observes, the
question of justiciability turns on the court's concept of the education
clause. 1°9 He states:
[Elvery single state supreme court that has held education finance adequacy
litigation to be nonjusticiable has stated a conception of the education
clause as a repository of discretionary duties, rather than of individual
rights ...[while] in every case where a court has stated a conception of the
education clause as a repository of individual rights, the court has engaged
10°
in or approved merits adjudication.
Professor Bauries is correct as to how justiciability is determined, but the
courts are incorrect that separation of powers requires an evaluation of
justiciability.
Quite simply, in the school finance context, the core issues are always
justiciable."' "Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional
design.""' A court may determine whether the constitutional text requires

within a state or even over all aspects of financing at the local level would face widespread and
strong political opposition.
104 ThE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 270 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
105 Id.
io6 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,954-56 (1983).
107 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,444-47 (1998).

io8 Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (111. 1996) ("What constitutes a 'high quality' education, and how it may best be provided, cannot be ascertained by
any judicially discoverable or manageable standards."); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662
A.2d 40, 58 (R.I. 1995) ("What constitutes an appropriate education or even an 'equal, adequate, and meaningful' one, 'is not likely to be divined for all time even by the scholars who
now so earnestly debate the issues."') (citation omitted).
109 Scott Bauries, Is Therean Elephantin the Room?: JudicialReview ofEducationalAdequacy
and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (on file
with author).
11 o Id. (manuscript at 48, on file with author).
I!I Thro, New Approach, supranote 3 1, at 546-47.
112 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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a specific quality level. Such an inquiry is nothing more than deciding the
meaning of the constitutional text. If a quality level is mandated, then a
court always may evaluate whether the current system meets that level.
Such an analysis is simply the application of a legal standard to particular
facts. A court that finds these issues to be non-justiciable is not deferring to
the separation of powers, but practicing judicial abdication." 3
Because school finance issues are always justiciable, the separation of
powers question focuses exclusively on the issue of remedy.'14 In creating
a remedy, judicial humility requires deference to the legislature." 5 The
complexity of educational policy suggests "that 'there will more than one
constitutionally permissible method of solving them,' and that, within the
limits of rationality, 'the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems' should
be entitled to respect."" 6 Judicial humility "allows courts to ensure that
'responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly
to the State and its officials' when the circumstances warrant.""' 7
Third, the judiciary must respect the constitutional allocation of
priorities. In states with high duty education clauses,"' the judiciary must
recognize that providing a quality education system takes priority over
other governmental concerns. It may be necessary to force the legislature
to choose between raising taxes or cutting non-education-related spending.
Conversely, if the state constitution limits the growth of government
113 Thro, New Approach, supra note 3 1, at 547.
114 As Professor Brown explains:
Some courts have retained jurisdiction. Others have imposed deadlines and made it clear that the educational process will come to a halt
unless the judicial mandate is obeyed. But even in such cases there is
considerable question as to what that mandate is beyond a duty to do
something. Indeed, individual justices have called on their colleagues to
spell out the contours of that duty. Instead of taking that step, the courts
offer a form of guidance. They seem to see the judicial role in these
cases as confined essentially to the articulation of general principles.
George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A FederalCourts Perspective on the State School
FinanceDecisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543, 549 (1994) (footnotes omitted). But see Jonathan Banks,
Note, State ConstitutionalAnalyses of Public School Finance Reform Cases: Myth or Methodology?
45 VAND.L. REv. 129, 156 (1992) (suggesting that state courts have deferred to the legislature
without any thought of oversight).
115 Of course, there is some dispute as to the extent of this deference. As Professor
Bauries notes, there are subtle differences in the deference approaches advocated by
Professors Obhoff, Redell, and myself. Bauries, supranote 1o9 . In sharp contrast, Professor
Ryan apparently sees no reason to defer to the other branches. See Ryan, supra note 14, at
1225.

i16 Villanueva v. Carere, 85 E3d 48 1,487 (1oth Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
117 Home v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2595 (2009).
118 See FLA.CONST. art. IX, § I; GA. CONsT. art. VIII, § i,para. 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § I;
ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. i, § i; WASH. CONsT. art. IX, § i.
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expenditures,1 9 it may be necessary to harmonize the obligation to provide
quality education with the strict limits on growth. Similarly, in those states
where a balanced budget is constitutionally required, 12 0 the judiciary must
harmonize the education clause with the balanced budget provision.
B. Rose's Respectfor OtherConstitutionalValues
Ultimately, Rose also demonstrated judicial humility by respecting
other constitutional values. First, while Kentucky does not have an explicit
constitutional provision concerning local control, Rose implicitly recognized
local control as a structural constitutional value. The court seemed aware
that the General Assembly would never contemplate abandoning local
school districts when it observed:
In no way does this constitutional requirement act as a limitation on the
General Assembly's power to create local school entities and to grant to
those entities the authority to supplement the state system. Therefore,
if the General Assembly decides to establish local school entities, it may
also empower them to enact local revenue initiatives to supplement the
uniform, equal educational effort that the General Assembly must provide.
This includes not only revenue measures similar to the special taxes
previously discussed, but also the power to assess local ad valorem taxes on
real property and personal property at a rate over and above that set by the
General Assembly to fund the statewide system of common schools. Such
local efforts may not be used by the General Assembly as a substitute for
providing an adequate, equal and substantially uniform educational system
throughout this state.1"'
In effect, the court seems to be harmonizing the structural constitutional
value of local control with the textual constitutional value of federalism.
Second, Rose understood that separation of powers cannot be used to
I2
justify abdication of responsibility and that the judicial role is limited.
I19 See CoLo. CoNsT. art. X, §

20.

12o Thirty-two States and Puerto Rico require a balanced budget. See RONALD K. SNELL,
NAT'L CONE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: PROVISIONS

PRACTICE, (1996), http://www.ncsl.org/lssuesResearch/BudgetTax/StateBalancedBudget
RequirementsProvisionsand/tabid/1265 i/Default.aspx.
121 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W2d 186, 211-12 (Ky. 1989) (footnote
omitted).
122 As the court explained:
AND

The issue before us-the constitutionality of the system of statutes
that created the common schools--is the only issue. To avoid deciding the case because of "legislative discretion," "legislative function,"
etc., would be a denigration of our own constitutional duty. To allow the
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The court was careful "not [to] instruct the General Assembly to enact any
specific legislation" or to "direct the members of the General Assembly
role was "only [to] decide the nature of the
to raise taxes." 113 The court's
2 4
constitutional mandate."
Third, Rose understood that separation of powers constrains the
remedial powers of the courts.' Moreover, because of Kentucky's explicit
separation of powers provisions, 2 6 the remedial powers of Kentucky courts
are more limited than the remedial powers of the federal judiciary.2 7
CONCLUSION

"Americans deserve not a liberal Court, not a conservative Court, not
even a wise or Solomonic Court, but a Court that respects the limits of

General Assembly (or, in point of fact, the Executive) to decide whether
iks actions are constitutional is literally unthinkable.
We believe that what these several cases cited as controlling by appellants mean is that great weight should be given to the decision of
the General Assembly. We believe they mean that the presumption of
constitutionality is substantial. We believe that they mean that legislative discretion-in this specific matter of common schools-4s to be
given great weight and, we do so in this decision. We do not question
the wisdom of the General Assembly's decision, only its failure to comply with its constitutional mandate. In so doing, we give deference and
weight to the General Assembly's enactments; however, we find them
constitutionally deficient.

Id.at

209.

123
124

Id.at
Id.

212.

125 In reversing the trial court's decision to exercise continuing jurisdiction, the court
declared:

The implications of such an open-ended judgment are very clear.
The trial court retains jurisdiction and supervision of the General
Assembly's effort to provide a constitutional system of common schools.
Under such an order, the General Assembly, in theory if not in practice,
would literally have to confer, report, and comply with the judge's view
of the legislation proposed to comply with the order. The legislation
would be that of the joint efforts of the General Assembly and the trial
court, with the latter having the final word. This is, without doubt, the
type of action that was eschewed when the framers of the four constitutions of this state placed the separation of powers doctrine in the organic
law of this state.

Id.at

214.

iz6 Ky. CONST. §§ 27-29.
127 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 214.
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its power and the place of others within the constitutional structure."'
That is the essence of judicial humility. A humble court "will not shrink
from [its] duty 'as the bulwar[k] of a limited constitution against legislative
encroachments,"'' 2 9 but it will allow the democratic process to decide
educational policy.
Rose invalidated all aspects of Kentucky's educational system, but it is
ultimately a judicially humble decision. The court exercised its "ultimate
power, and the duty, to apply, interpret, [and] define .. .the Kentucky
Constitution,"' 30 but it allowed "the General Assembly to re-create, and
re-establish a system of common schools within this state which will be in
compliance with the Constitution."'13' It was the democratic process, not
the judiciary that determined how to satisfy the constitutional obligations.
The General Assembly-implicitly acknowledging both political reality and
the constitutional limitation of local control-chose to enact reform rather
than a revolution. Instead of dividing and consolidating school districts,
moving to a system of centralized financing, or radically altering teacher
compensation, the legislature chose a path that retained the present school
districts, continued a significant degree of local financing, and devoted
additional resources to the current teacher compensation scheme. 3 This
embrace of judicial humility is the enduring legacy of Rose.

128 J.Harvie Wilkinson III, The Rehnquist Court At Twilight: The Lures and Perils of
Split-the-Difference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1969, 1996 (2006).
129 Nw.Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009) (quoting
TME FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
13o Rose, 790 S.W. 2d at 209.
131 Id.at 214.
132 This is not a criticism of the profound and significant reforms undertaken by the
Kentucky Education Reform Act. See Kentucky Education Reform Act of 199o, ch. 476, 1990
Ky. Acts 1zo8. Rather, it is an acknowledgment that the pre-Rose and post-Rose educational
systems are structurally the same.

